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Abstract
The revelation principle has been known in the economics society for decades. In
this paper, I will investigate it from a physical perspective, i.e., considering the
energy consumed by agents and the designer in participating a mechanism.
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1 Introduction
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in economics theory. Ac-
cording to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
(Page 884, Line 24 [1]): “The implication of the revelation principle is ... to
identify the set of implementable social choice functions, we need only identify
those that are truthfully implementable.”
So far, the revelation principle has been applied to many disciplines such as
auction, contract, the theory of incentives and so on. If we move eyes from
economics to physics, it is well-known that the world is a physical world, doing
any action requires energy. In this paper, I will investigate the revelation prin-
ciple from a physical perspective, i.e., studying how much energy is required
for agents and the designer in participating a mechanism. Section 2 and 3 are
the main parts of this paper. Section 4 draws conclusions. Related definitions
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and proofs are given in Appendix, which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D
[1].
2 Energy matrices
Let us consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1, · · · , I (page 858 [1]).
These agents make a collective choice from some set X of possible alternatives.
Prior to the choice, each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines
his preferences. The set of possible types for agent i is denoted as Θi. The
vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from set Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI
according to probability density φ(·). Each agent i’s Bernoulli utility function
when he is of type θi is ui(x, θi). A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a
collection of I sets S1, · · · , SI , each Si containing agent i’s possible actions (or
plans of action), and an outcome function g : S → X, where S = S1×· · ·×SI
(page 883, Line 7 [1]).
At first sight, it looks trivial to discriminate the exact format of agent i’s
strategy. Because the two formats of strategies, actions and plans of action,
just correspond to the same results in the traditional theory of mechanism
design. However, from a physical perspective, an action should be viewed
different from a plan of action.
For any agent i, if his strategy si(·) is of an action format, I denote by Ea the
energy required for agent i to choose it (i.e., performing the action). Otherwise
agent i’s strategy si(·) is of a message format (i.e., a plan of action), and I
denote by Em the energy required for agent i to choose it (i.e., selecting the
message). Generally speaking, an action is laborious, to carry out it requires
more energy; whereas a plan of action is an oral message, to select it requires
less energy. This is consistent to the common sense in the real world. Therefore,
it is natural to assume Ea > Em. Note the private type of agent i can also
be represented as a message, because agent i can announce it to the designer.
In addition, I define by Esend and Eg the energy consumed in sending out a
message and performing the outcome function g(·) respectively.
Now let us consider the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that implements
the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then f(·) is
truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the corresponding
direct revelation mechanism Γdirect = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , g(s∗(·))). Let us consider
two different cases:
Case 1: Γ is oral, in which each agent i’s strategy is of a message format (i.e.,
a plan of action).
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1) Participating Γ: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i selects the strategy s∗i (θi)
and send it to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I ·(Em+
Esend). The designer receives I messages and perform the outcome function
g(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is Eg.
2) Participating Γdirect: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i announces a type as a
message to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I ·Esend.
The designer receives I messages and perform the outcome function g(s∗(·)).
Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is I · Em + Eg.
Case 2: Γ is laborious, in which each agent i’s strategy is of an action format.
1) Participating Γ: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i performs his action s∗i (θi).
Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I · Ea. The designer perform the
outcome function g(·). Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is Eg.
2) Participating Γdirect: Given any θ ∈ Θ, each agent i announces a type as a
message to the designer. Hence, the energy consumed by I agents is I ·Esend.
The designer receives I messages and perform the outcome function g(s∗(·)).
Hence, the energy consumed by the designer is I · Ea + Eg.
Table 1: An energy matrix of I agents and the designer. The first entry de-
notes the energy consumed by I agents, and the second stands for the energy
consumed by the designer.hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhStrategy format
Mechanism
Γ Γdirect
Oral (a message) [I · (Em + Esend), Eg] [I · Esend, I · Em + Eg]
Laborious (an action) [I · Ea, Eg] [I · Esend, I · Ea + Eg]
Usually, Em, Eg and Esend are small. Suppose they can be neglected, then
Table 1 is reduced to Table 2:
Table 2: A simplified energy matrix of I agents and the designer.hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhStrategy format
Mechanism
Γ Γdirect
Oral (a message) [0, 0] [0, 0]
Laborious (an action) [I · Ea, 0] [0, I · Ea]
In terms of computer science, when agents’ strategies are actions instead of
plans of action, the complexity of the energy consumed by the designer in
Γdirect is O(I), which cannot be neglected. Therefore, in order to make the
direct revelation mechanism Γdirect work, an energy condition should be added:
The designer possesses enough energy, at least the sum of energy that all agents
would consume when they participate the original indirect mechanism Γ.
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3 Discussions
In this section, I will propose two problems in front of the designer when the
strategies of agents are of an action format:
1) In the direct mechanism Γdirect, does the designer possess enough energy
to carry out all actions that would be done by agents in the original indirect
mechanism Γ? (Generally speaking, there are many factors that may be rel-
evant to agents’ actions, e.g., skill, energy, quality etc. For simplicity, here I
only consider one indispensable factor, i.e., the energy required to carry out
an action.)
According to Page 378, the 9th line to the last [2], “... the mechanism designer
is always at an informational disadvantage with respect to the agents, who,
as a collective entity, know more about the true environment that does the
designer”. Based on this idea, it looks somewhat “unreasonable” to assume
that the designer is always at an energy advantage with respect to the agents,
i.e., the designer possesses enough energy that is not less than the sum of all
agents’ energy.
As shown in Table 2, the energy condition is very weak when the strategies
of agents are of a message format. However, when the strategies of agents are
of an action format, the energy condition may be restrictive. The designer
cannot take it for granted that he is always able to carry out all actions on
behalf of all agents. When the power of the designer is restricted such that
the energy condition does not hold, the revelation principle will not hold.
2) Furthermore, even if the energy condition is satisfied, there still exists an-
other problem for the designer. As shown in Table 2, when the designer chooses
the indirect mechanism Γ, he nearly spends zero energy; but if the designer
chooses the direct mechanism Γdirect, he has to spend I · Ea energy to make
Γdirect work. Note that in the theory of mechanism design, the designer only
care whether and how the social choice function f(·) can be implemented. Since
Γ and Γdirect implement the same f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, why does
the designer have incentives to work harder, i.e., choose Γdirect instead of Γ? A
possible answer is that the revelation principle may be not proper for a social
choice function that is implemented by a “laborious” indirect mechanism in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose that: 1) If an indirect mechanism is oral (i.e., the
strategies of agents are of a message format), then there is no problem in the
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revelation principle (Note: this result holds under the assumption that Em, Eg
and Esend can be neglected). 2) If an indirect mechanism is laborious (i.e., the
strategies of agents are of an action format), then an energy condition should
be added to make the revelation principle hold in the real world. Furthermore,
it is questionable to claim that the designer has incentives to work harder,
but finally implement the same social choice function. Hence, the revelation
principle is perhaps not proper for a social choice function that can only be
implemented by a “laborious” indirect mechanism.
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Appendix: Definitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Definition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : Θ1×· · ·×ΘI →
X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types (θ1, · · · , θI), assigns a
collective choice f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X.
Definition 23.B.3: A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1, · · · , SI and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X.
Definition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = Θi for all i and g(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI .
Definition 23.D.1: The strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all
θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(sˆi, s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi]
for all sˆi ∈ Si.
Definition 23.D.2: The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the
social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 23.D.3: The social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if s∗i (θi) = θi (for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I) is a
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism Γ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)).
That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(f(θi, θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi], (23.D.1)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi.
Proposition 23.D.1 (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that im-
plements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof : Since Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements f(·) in Bayesian Nash equi-
librium, then there exists a profile of strategies s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) such
that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ, and for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(sˆi, s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi], (23.D.2)
for all sˆi ∈ Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies that for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(s∗i (θˆi), s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi], (23.D.3)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi. Since g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ, (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi], (23.D.4)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f(·)
to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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